by Peter Jenkins A White House press statement, dated July 1, claims that there is a “longstanding non-proliferation standard of no enrichment for Iran.” This claim is false. For more than 40 years, the United States and its Western allies… Continue Reading
by Peter Jenkins There is a flaw in the Iranian plan to use partial non-implementation of the 2015 nuclear agreement (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA)—and maybe eventual withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—to put pressure on… Continue Reading
by Peter Jenkins Iran’s patience with Europe’s feeble submission to one of the most villainous U.S. administrations of all time finally ran out on May 8. That day President Hassan Rouhani told the European parties to the Joint Comprehensive Plan… Continue Reading
by Peter Jenkins On May 3, the U.S. Department of State announced: Starting May 4, assistance to expand Iran’s Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant beyond the existing reactor unit could be sanctionable. In addition, activities to transfer enriched uranium out of Iran… Continue Reading
by Peter Jenkins My most natural starting point may be an account of what the secretary general of Pugwash, a German colleague, and I learned in Moscow on January 28 in meetings with Russia’s foreign minister and the appropriate deputy… Continue Reading