by Dalia Hatuqa
It would have been a startling assertion had it not been heard before. Last week, Benjamin Netanyahu declared that he would not be evacuating any settlements in the West Bank. “We are here to stay, forever,” the Israeli prime minister said at the settlement of Barkan. “We will deepen our roots, build, strengthen and settle.”
There are approximately 500,000 settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem today, and their evacuation is a principal tenet of any likely solution to the conflict. The last time peace talks between the Palestinians and Israel broke down in 2014 it was mostly over settlements. At the time, Secretary of State John Kerry was deeply invested in the process, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas had relayed several demands to facilitate his engagement with the Israelis.
But Abbas didn’t get anything he asked for, including the basic understandings about negotiations that Palestinians considered a minimum. His call for a settlement freeze was turned down for a “major slowdown.” When he asked for basing the talks on the 1967 borders, Kerry said he could only support that position in writing. And yet despite how little he was offered, Abbas told the broader Palestinian leadership that he would support resuming negotiations nonetheless.
Various Palestinian political parties disagreed with Abbas’ decision, seeing it as capitulation. And despite Abbas relinquishing, Kerry’s efforts failed as soon as Netanyahu announced approval of thousands more settlement units in the West Bank.
Netanyahu’s support for settlements is longstanding. His most recent comments came on the heels of Israel’s marking 50 years of settling in the West Bank, just days after President Donald Trump’s advisor and son-in-law, Jared Kushner met with him and Abbas separately.
The meeting between Kushner and Abbas yielded the usual results: an assurance that Trump wanted to secure a “lasting peace” between the two parties, vague references to the importance of direct negotiations, and an assertion that peace would take some time to reach. Abbas had heard it all before, and his frustrations at the lack of clarity began to boil over in the following days.
His exasperation was made clear when he told a visiting delegation from the Meretz party: “I have met with Trump’s envoys about 20 times since the beginning of his term as president of the United States. Every time they repeatedly stressed to me how much they believe and are committed to a two-state solution and a halt to construction in the settlements.”
He did not mince his words, and his desperation was palpable. “I have pleaded with them to say the same thing to Netanyahu, but they refrained,” Abbas continued. “They said they would consider it but then they didn’t get back to me.”
Ever since Abbas was voted president 12 years ago, successive US administrations have made similar promises. Envoys and delegates came to Ramallah and went, and many peace plans were heralded with absolute certainty. The only difference is that Trump’s plan remains a mystery, which ironically was a source of brief optimism for the Palestinians. The Palestinian leadership initially viewed Trump’s ad hoc style as an opportunity to stop the new administration from kicking the can down the road as its predecessors had done.
But that ray of hope was soon extinguished when Abbas began to realize that the current administration would not even commit itself to the two-state solution, the hallmark of the decades-old US-sponsored peace process.
Just recently, State Department Spokeswoman Heather Nauert said a recommittal by the Trump administration to the two-state solution would show “bias” to one side—perhaps an admission that the Israeli government has dropped the pretense of negotiating a peace deal based on two states.
Abbas has also become aware that the company Trump keeps—Kushner, the American ambassador to Israel David Friedman, and special envoy Jason Greenblatt—all have deep personal ties to Israel (and even settlements) and have not been shy about expressing their support for it.
Just last week, in a marked break from standard language used in US diplomatic protocol, Friedman called the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza “alleged.” Greenblatt has previously stated that he does not view settlements as an obstacle to peace, and Kushner’s family has in past years donated to the Beit El settlement.
Meanwhile Abbas is finding himself in the dark with no solid clues given to the US president’s proposed peace plan. According to an Israeli media report, the Americans reportedly asked for a “grace period” to put a plan together.
But as the Trump administration works out its “ultimate deal,” the Israeli population in the West Bank continues to grow: just one day before Kushner’s visit, Israel announced the first new settlement in two decades. After he left, authorities announced they were moving ahead with plans to build 7,000 units in East Jerusalem settlements.
Amid this flurry of uncertainty and doubt, Abbas has bent over backwards to show his new American interlocutors that he is all in. The latest was a series of sanctions he imposed on Hamas, the rulers of Gaza, that included cutting payments to Israel for electricity provided to the coastal enclave, leaving Palestinians with roughly four hours of power a day. He also slashed the salaries of hundreds of thousands of public employees and withheld permits needed for patients to leave Gaza.
As US-led negotiations are the only game in town for the Palestinian Authority, Abbas doesn’t have many choices available. But according to those close to him, he is unsure about how to proceed given the goal posts have been moved once again. “If we don’t know where we are heading, if we don’t know what the end game is, then we are in a desert without a map,” said Mohammad Shtayyeh, a senior adviser to Abbas. “We have seen it happen before. We are not going to see it happen again.”
Without even a pledge of support from the Americans for a Palestinian state or a demand to Israel to halt settlement-building, it’s easy to predict how the discussion at the UN General Assembly, convening in mere weeks, will play out. With dwindling support among Palestinians, and rising anger at the political stalemate, Abbas will have to revive his previous threat to head to the International Criminal Court or to ask the UN to recognize a State of Palestine. Washington will try to avert both situations, and the Ha’aretz daily recently reported that Trump will meet with Abbas and Netanyahu on the UNGA sidelines precisely to do that.
“The Americans said they need more time to draft something and asked Abu Mazen not to make international moves like joining additional UN agencies or launching proceedings at the International Criminal Court in The Hague,” a Palestinian official said to Ha’aretz, using Abbas’ nom de guerre.
In the meantime, Abbas and his inner circle will likely just play along, kicking the can down the road even further themselves, as Israel cements its grip on the West Bank and its siege of Gaza. The 82-year-old Palestinian president will try to escape the next four years without being pressured into giving up even more, not daring to take the consequences that he knows come with a refusal to negotiate at all under new parameters.
Dalia Hatuqa is a journalist based in Washington, DC, and the West Bank.
Yeah right, Bobby’s comments are a little confusing to say the least. However, the problem with your reference to the rules of occupation is that they only apply when country X occupies country Y. For example, Israel occupies the Golan Heights and occupied Sinai which were both recognized parts of existing nations. The “west bank” was never a nation. It was Turkish land which was seized by the UK when the Ottoman Empire collapsed. There were various plans for its disposition but they NEVER went into effect (the Arabs rejected the Partition plan). Israel declared its own state in 1948 but the Arabs never declared a Palestinian state in the West Bank. Jordan seized the West Bank and then lost it in 1967, thereafter relinquishing its claim. But that was a meaningless gesture since Jordan had already lost control of the West Bank to Israel.
Fast forward to today. The West Bank is not “occupied” territory in the traditional sense. The Palestinians claim it is or should be part of their own state and various people can support them, even the UN could vote that way, but that does not change the facts, which are Israel is not occupying any land in the West Bank that belonged to an existing country.
Israel is within its historical rights to annex the West Bank. In fact its rights are stronger there than with the Golan which after all was part of Syria. However, under a long established historical principle, when country A is the aggressor against country B but loses land in the process of the war, country B may choose to retain the conquered land or not as it sees fit.
The UN is a body of nations that vote to make suggestions which are sometimes (rarely) backed up by the use of force. The UN’s decisions are often quite inconsistent, pretending to invoke rules which the member states themselves previously benefited by violating. Most nations have at one point in time conquered land and never relinquished it.
I think Israel has the right to retain the Golan (if it so sees fit) as land forfeited by the aggressor. Of course you may claim Israel not Syria was the aggressor but that’s a different matter.
But the Arabs in the West Bank are eventually going to have to accept some sort of peace terms which will for the most part be to Israel’s favor because that is the nature of such things. Otherwise, at some point in time they will be left with no options at all.
I think my proposal is the most realistic and best deal the Arabs can hope for. They might have been able to strike better deals in the past, but then they could have accepted the partition plan or at least set up a Palestinian state in 1949, but they did not do so.
VoR: ” However, the problem with your reference to the rules of occupation is that they only apply when country X occupies country Y.”
I stopped reading your stuff riiiiiiigth there, because that statement is 100% incorrect.
Not only that but I can point out exactly where you have confused yourself into error.
It is this: you have taken the oft-stated Israeli claim that the articles of the GENEVA CONVENTIONS don’t apply to this belligerent occupation because “they only apply when country X occupies country Y”, and conflated that into a claim that the Laws of Belligerent Occupation only apply when “country X occupies country Y”.
Whoever true (it is false, but that’s another matter) the former argument might be, the latter argument is demonstrably incorrect.
As in……
HCJ 2056/04, again: “The general point of departure of all parties – which is also our point of departure – is that Israel holds the area in belligerent occupation (occupatio bellica).”
I need to stress that point: not only are you wrong, but the IHCJ agrees with me that you are wrong.
So why do they agree with me and not with you?
Because……
HCJ 2056/04, again: “The authority of the military commander flows from the provisions of public international law regarding belligerent occupation. These rules are established principally in the Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907 [hereinafter – the Hague Regulations]. These regulations reflect customary international law.”
I’ll stress that last part: These [i.e.Hague] Regulations REFLECT CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
I can’t stress that enough: any claim that the Hague Regulations *don’t* apply “here” or *don’t* apply “there” is incorrect. They apply e.v.e.r.y.w.h.e.r.e. that there is war or, as the result of war, there is occupation.
Q: Even if it isn’t country-on-country?
A: Yes, the Hague Regs still apply.
Q: Even if the territory doesn’t belong to either country?
A: Yes, the Hague Regs still apply.
Q: Even if… err… even if?
A: Yes, the Hague Regs still apply.
Q: Why, exactly?
A: Because of a ruling by the post-WW2 Nuremberg Tribunals that the Hague Regs had become “declaratory of the laws and customs of war”.
Your argument is not only wrong, but has been wrong for over 70 years.
I don’t think you understand the thrust of my argument. You are correct that currently Israel’s High Court considers the West Bank under “military occupation” because the government does as well. Israel should in the context of a resolution of the dispute annex the West Bank. At that point in time, it would no longer be subject to military occupation and your analysis is no longer pertinent.
As for the Arabs residing there, I have explained that some but not most will be offered citizenship. The rest will be citizens of Jordan/Palestine and it is up to that Arab leader to give them whatever rights Jordanians have. They will be permitted to live as resident aliens (perhaps with limited rights to vote in municipal elections).
The Hague Convention of 1907 does not address a situation exactly like the one for Palestine between 1917 and 1948.
VoR: “I don’t think you understand the thrust of my argument.”
I don’t think you understand the legalities.
VoR: “You are correct that currently Israel’s High Court considers the West Bank under “military occupation” because the government does as well.”
I assume you are saying that the Court accepts that it is an occupied territory because that is what the Government says, and so what the govt says is what the court thinks.
If so then you are in error.
If you mean that *both* the Israeli court *and* the Israeli government accept that this is a belligerent occupation because, well, yeah, that’s what happens when your army seizes a territory by force of arms then you would be correct. Article 42, Hague Regulations.
VoR: “Israel should in the context of a resolution of the dispute annex the West Bank.”
This can not be stressed enough: Israel can not u.n.i.l.a.t.e.r.a.l.l.y. annex any territory that it holds under a belligerent occupation. That is “the acquisition of territory by war” (a.k.a. “conquest”) and that is quite inadmissible under international law.
If the Palestinians agree to a merger with Israel then, yes, that would be legal.
But a unilateral annexation? No, that’s a very, very serious war crime.
VoR: “At that point in time, it would no longer be subject to military occupation and your analysis is no longer pertinent.”
You have to posit some way of getting to that point, and – again, I have to stress this – the only legal way is via the agreement of those who are under occupation i.e. the Palestinians.
VoR: “As for the Arabs residing there, I have explained that some but not most will be offered citizenship.”
OK, did I mention that the only legal way to annex is via the agreement of those who are under occupation? I think I did.
They get a say, VoR, and they are going to say “No” to an “offer of citizenship” that does not include all of them.
This is an occupation, VoR, and – quite literally – the occupied Come With The Territory.
So if you want to annex all the territory then you have to annex all the people on that territory. To do otherwise is to seize that territory from them, and That Is Conquest.
And Conquest Is Illegal.
It’s a pretty simple concept…..
VoR: “The Hague Convention of 1907 does not address a situation exactly like the one for Palestine between 1917 and 1948.”
OK, I’m going to repeat something that has been held to be indisputably true since the end of WW2 and the Nuremberg Trials: The Hague Regulations are “declaratory of the laws AND CUSTOMS of war”.
They “address” every situation in which there is “war” or, in the aftermath of war, there is “occupation”.