by Graham E. Fuller
Over the years “containment” has been a key US political instrument by which it has sought to isolate, starve out, or excommunicate from the “international community” regimes unwilling to accept the US-dominated world order.
Yet the great irony today is that this very US policy of containment seems now to characterize the way many major powers in the world have come to think about dealing with the US. These states don’t actually use the word “containment,” but the intent is still the same; they perceive the need to “contain” or constrain Washington, thereby limiting the damage that the US can inflict upon their national interests without engaging in outright confrontation with the US.
Containment has been a reasonably sensible way of dealing with hostile states that cannot be readily defeated militarily except at potentially huge military cost to the US itself—especially if it risks nuclear war. Both the Soviet Union and China for many decades were “contained” due to their perceived radical ideologies and hostility to the US-dominated world order. These two states also supported many radical leftist revolutionary movements around the world that ideologically opposed the US. (Often these movements had good reason to be hostile and revolutionary, frequently due to terrible domestic conditions in their own countries—and under regimes often supported by Washington. Cuba, Chile, and Nicaragua come to mind, although US eventually made efforts to overthrow them after their revolutions.)
In more recent decades the US applied containment policies to Saddam’s Iraq and to Iran. Containment of North Korea has been a long-standing policy, arguably wiser than most other options. Indeed, might not continued containment of Saddam in Iraq have been the wiser policy compared to the Pandora’s Box unleashed by the US invasion and occupation of Iraq and its still unfolding wide regional fallout? But containment also raises some searching questions. One is that once on the US “containment list” it is often hard for a state to ever get off it, short of being targeted by US-sponsored “regime change.” One becomes a “rogue regime.” And the biggest problem with being “contained” is that in some ways it becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy of enduring hostility.
Since the end of the Cold War the world has come to look rather different. Among states that have attained reasonably comfortable living standards there is less appetite for confrontation or war. As a result the self-assumed US “burden of global leadership” in war and peace on the international scene is seen as a less desirable commodity than before. Hence fewer nations and peoples are willing to risk the potential war that US “leadership” might today bring about —in Korea, in Europe vis-a-vis NATO’s confrontations along the Russian borders, in patrolling the straits of Taiwan, or war in Venezuela, or “maintaining the free flow of oil” in the Persian Gulf (when such free flow has almost never been challenged.)
Increasing numbers of international polls over the years suggest that the populations of many countries in the world have now come to view the US itself as one of the biggest threats to global peace. The US—almost continually at war somewhere since the fall of the USSR—increasingly gravitates towards military approaches to handling global crises. Even before Trump’s presidency US diplomacy has grown ever weaker in the face of rising US regional military commands that dwarf the authority and skills of our ambassadors abroad. The commander of US AFRICOM, for example, presides over a massive military budget and effectively represents the dominant voice of US policy in Africa. These institutionalized military resources dwarf the financial and political power of any single US ambassador in any African country. No wonder such maldistribution of US power abroad leads to a enhanced consideration of military solutions over political or diplomatic ones.
In today’s rapidly shifting world scene the US is arguably more upset than any other major country by the nature and speed of strategic global shifts in power. Blame games are in Washington are rife. The US had grown used to being in the driver’s seat of the world order that it engineered since the end of World War II. It seems almost inconceivable to most Americans—and to some foreigners who grew up in that same environment—to imagine a world in which the US is no longer the architect or the supreme arbiter of that global order.
This shift thus generates serious anxieties in Washington over its (relatively) declining power. These anxieties lead to a constant need to publicly reinforce at home and abroad the belief that US power has indeed not slipped at all. The US increasingly invokes the argument that military action is required somewhere, if for nothing else than “to maintain US credibility.” In short, if you don’t act, however unwise such action might be, you might be broadcasting weakness and no longer representing a credible “commitment.” Hence we move into the seventeenth year of war in Afghanstan. This is all part of the great danger in the dangerous dance of rising and declining powers. The psychology intrinsic to both rising and declining power can be dangerous. As a result the US is treated by outsiders with caution, even as perhaps a snake capable of striking out unexpectedly.
The upshot is widespread global nervousness about US intentions and actions—even before Trump—and their risky or unwanted consequences. And that is why much of the world now thinks in terms of damage limitation when it anticipates more aggressive US policies.
If we were then to settle on any one single description of the psychology that characterizes Chinese and Russian strategy these days it is indeed “containment” of the US. The EU too, for example, increasingly believes it needs to take its relations with Russia into its own hands, rather than potentially be led into a military confrontation with Russia via dubious NATO exercises on Moscow’s borders. Supporting US “credibility” is not high on the European foreign policy wish list (except understandably for those few small neighbors sadly doomed to eternal life next to the Russian Bear.) South Korean leadership too finds playing the US card sometimes diplomatically useful, but posing a huge danger if Washington is actually willing to unleash war—in which Seoul has everything to lose. Indeed, the one state in the world that tends to completely support US military action almost anywhere in the world these days is Israel.
Finally, the concept of “containment” raises a deeper point about the psychology of international relations. How wise is it to maintain lists of enemy states and leaders who require containment? Few other states do so, partially because declaring another state to be an enemy has obvious negative consequences that easily lead to self-fulfilling prophesy. This phenomenon is fundamental to the very psychology of human relationships. If we signal to someone that we consider them a threat or an enemy, the chances are very good that the other party will reciprocate and that mutual relations will predictably deteriorate. That is why shrewd “good neighbor policies” represent more than just naive feel-goodism. Yet the US still spends a great deal of time drawing up and announcing lists of who is an enemy, or a rival, and who must be punished or contained.
For better or for worse, the international order of the late 20th century is gone. In a period of major strategic change the US seems determined to cling to the status quo that so long favored it. Yet it might be wise for Washington to stop yearning for it—and for all the trouble that now offers. Perhaps rather than the endless search for enemies (”dragons to slay abroad”) that is the daily stuff of most Washington strategists and think tanks, a determination to adjust to and find common cause with new world powers would yield somewhat more desirable results all around.
Graham E. Fuller is a former senior CIA official, author of numerous books on the Muslim World; his latest book is “Breaking Faith: A novel of espionage and an American’s crisis of conscience in Pakistan.” (Amazon, Kindle). Reprinted, with permission, from grahamefuller.com
Excellent treatise on the way things are. I would just add three elements which favor the “contained” states..
(1) The government of a US-contained state benefits in its domestic dominance (which all governments love) by having an enemy. It’s “death to America” and forget the high price of bread,
(2) The government of a US-contained state is encouraged seek allies in its area to thwart US policy and seek a counter-force. A good example is the enhanced China-ASEAN relationship which China has fostered due to US aggression in its area of interest. In return ASEAN has declared its support of China. And there is also the enhanced China-Russia relationship, reversing Nixon’s strategy.
(3) The “contained” state is able to parlay its notoriety into increased support from other states in the world including even US allies. Iran (an “isolated regime” in US parlance was the head to the 120-nation Non-Aligned Movement. Isolated? I don’t think so. Similar with North Korea, another “isolated regime” according to the US which has formal diplomatic relations with 164 countries, according to the U.S.-based National Committee on North Korea.
It’s a fascinating subject, thanks for covering it. Someone might write a book on it.
Despite all points brought upfront in last twenty years of international scene by Mr.Fuller,may i say these unleashing of multi polar world was inevitable after dissolution of USSR and lesser degree introduction of China .Agreed many monumental blunders committed by USA especially second Iraq war and mishandling of middle east.
Correct message, wrong messenger. There are very people more responsible for the intractable hostility between the United States and the Russian Federation than the author. It is not at all clear whether he understands that the world he envisions towards the end of his article is completely incompatible with support for the “militants” and “insurgents” at Beslan and the Boston Marathon.
Re: “The EU too, for example, increasingly believes it needs to take its relations with Russia into its own hands, rather than potentially be led into a military confrontation with Russia via dubious NATO exercises on Moscow’s borders.”
Given that the EU, far more so than Washington, never mind NATO, was the chief architect of the showdown with Russia over the Ukraine, it’s a bit late in the day for Brussels to be whining about a potential military confrontation with Russia. More to the point, no nations are more shrill about the need for military defense against Russia than those EU members bordering it: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
The EU was desperate to pull the Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and into it’s own, hence it’s involvement in and support for the coup that overthrew the pro-Russian government. A classic case of empire building. Washington only got involved because of the EU. Unfortunately for the EU, it tried to play big power games without being a power and found out what real powers do when messed with.
You can blame Washington for a lot of screw ups. But not this one.
“The EU was desperate to pull the Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and into it’s own, hence it’s involvement in and support for the coup that overthrew the pro-Russian government. A classic case of empire building.”
Wrong. The US neocon Victoria Nuland was the chief architect of the Kyev coup, including the relationship with the US-sponsored NGO that provided the new PM. She bragged about spending $5 billion in the exercise which was designed to gain another NATO member on Russia’s border and to grab Russia’s only warm-water port.The State Department controls the prime funding sources for non-military intervention, including the controversial National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which Washington created to fund covert and clandestine actions which in the Kyev case included shooters attacking partisans on both sides.
Several weeks before Ukraine’s 2014 coup, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Nuland had already picked Arseniy Yatsenyuk (“Yats”) to be the future leader. “Yats is the guy who’s got the economic experience, the governing experience,” Nuland said at the time.The EU favored another new PM in Kyev. Then came the famous release of the Nuland phone call with Pyatt of State.
Pyatt: Yeah I saw that. Nuland: OK. He’s now gotten both Serry and [UN Secretary General] Ban Ki-moon to agree that Serry could come in Monday or Tuesday. So that would be great, I think, to help glue this thing and to have the UN help glue it and, you know, F**k the EU.
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