by Peter Jenkins
What went wrong? Why were the United States and Iran unable to come to a comprehensive agreement in Vienna on Monday?
According to an Iranian source close to the negotiations, the main obstacle was the inability of the US negotiators to convince Iranian counterparts that the administration could persuade Congress to repeal relevant sanctions provisions.
Of course, the American negotiators offered executive waivers to exempt banks and exporters from US penalties for violating US sanctions legislation. But for the Iranian negotiators, a promise of waivers was not enough.
The Iranians reasoned—not unreasonably—that the promise of waivers could be ignored by President Barack Obama’s successor. They were well aware that European banks, some of which have been hit in recent years by gargantuan US fines, are unlikely to risk further such blows post-Obama by resuming normal business with Iran. On the contrary, non-US financial and trading companies are likely to be inhibited by the knowledge that this Damoclean sword, fashioned in the smithies of Capitol Hill, hangs over them.
This is but one explanation of why an agreement proved elusive on Monday. No doubt there are others. But this one rings true. It is certainly the case that European banks have become very wary of US sanctions provisions, and that they will not respond to the repeal of EU bilateral sanctions as Iran would wish while the threat of US penalties remains.
It is tempting to lament the lack of foresight of the first Obama administration. Their misguided belief that Iran could be coerced through sanctions into dismantling its uranium enrichment program led them to acquiesce to Congressional legislation that now stands between President Obama and the only achievement likely to stifle a hollow laugh, when future generations recall that he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009.
But lamenting gets one nowhere. What’s needed is a solution to this problem—since, absent a solution, it looks unlikely that any number of extensions to the negotiation with Iran will lead to a comprehensive agreement.
I feel disabled by citizenship and ignorance from contributing anything more than a question. Could a concerted and determined European lobbying campaign help to sway enough senators into repealing or amending the problematic provisions?
The news that reaches my side of the Atlantic suggests the answer is “no.”
Congress has been in a highly partisan mood and is likely to remain so when it reassembles in January; so Senate Republicans are unlikely to be ready to facilitate a foreign policy success—even one that is in the US national interest.
If these days any country has a “special relationship” with the US, it is not the United Kingdom or other European nations; it is Israel. And we can all predict, based on his own public statements over the years, that Israel’s prime minister will fight tooth and claw to prevent the repeal of the legislation in question. Pitted against Israeli anxieties, and Congressional campaign funding considerations, Britain’s strategic loyalty to its US ally on many occasions, as well as cultural affinities, will count for very little.
Nonetheless, I hope it occurs to the US administration to encourage its European partners to bring to bear on the Senate whatever influence they have. It will be a disaster for US and EU interests in the Middle East if a vital nuclear non-proliferation policy founders on US sanctions legislation.
Is there no other aspect of the negotiation on which it could founder? My source suggests the Iranian side believes that the only other area in which significant problems remain is uranium enrichment. My source is confident, however, that these differences can be resolved if a solution can be found to the sanctions problem.
My own sense is that this optimism is not misplaced. I will explain why when I next write.