Trump’s Middle East Peace Plan: Doomed to Failure

U.S. Ambassador to Israel David Friedman with Jared Kushner and Jason Greenblatt (U.S. Embassy Jerusalem via Flickr)

by Mitchell Plitnick

The regional tour of Donald Trump’s primary Middle East envoys—his lawyer, Jason Greenblatt, and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner—has concluded. So, it’s an appropriate time to take stock of the peace plan the Trump team seems to be formulating.

Only the Trump team seems particularly eager to see this plan come about, which is telling. It is hard to be optimistic about the deal, given that the Kushner & Greenblatt Traveling Road Show met with everyone involved except the Palestinians. No matter what Jason and Jared may have heard, none of their Arab interlocutors is in a position to move forward on a deal that the Palestinians have summarily rejected.

Trump approaches the entire question of Palestine transactionally, in line with his approach to most issues. This view was reflected in an interview Kushner gave to the Palestinian newspaper, al-Quds. He told reporter Walid Abu-Zalaf, “At the end of the day, I believe that Palestinian people are less invested in the politicians’ talking points than they are in seeing how a deal will give them and their future generations new opportunities, more and better paying jobs and prospects for a better life.”

If Kushner believes that a slight uptick in average household income will obscure Palestinian concerns about settlements, refugees, Jerusalem, and the very nature of their national existence, he is gravely mistaken. But the entire interview seems to reflect just such a view. Referring to Palestinian spokesman Nabil Abu Rudeineh’s statement that the US efforts were doomed, Kushner remarked that the “Palestinian leadership is saying those things because they are scared we will release our peace plan and the Palestinian people will actually like it because it will lead to new opportunities for them to have a much better life.”

These statements make it clear that Kushner has not only misunderstood the Palestinian leadership, but Palestinians in general. US negotiators have routinely, and justifiably, been accused of being deaf to the pulse of the Palestinian people, but Kushner seems even more hard of hearing than usual. And there is virtually no chance that Greenblatt, US Ambassador to Israel David Friedman, or certainly Trump himself know any more about Palestinian sentiments than Kushner does.

The Trump team has shrouded the peace plan in mystery. If there are any seasoned and informed hands talking to them, they’d be well-advised to urge Trump to delay revealing this plan indefinitely. Right now, the plan has no chance of success. Indeed, it could do a great deal of damage.

The Details

Although nothing has been confirmed about any potential Trump peace plan, there have been persistent rumors about the basic points. Nothing is ever certain with Trump, but the details that have been circulating are cause for great concern.

  • “The Americans are indeed planning to offer the Palestinians Abu Dis rather than East Jerusalem as the capital of their state. In exchange, Israel will withdraw from three to five Arab villages and neighborhoods east and north of Jerusalem. The Old City will remain in Israel’s hands,” according to Haaretz’s Amos Harel. Saudi Arabia would be given some involvement in administering the Temple Mount, although exactly what that means is unclear.
  • Israel would not evacuate any other West Bank settlements and would maintain full control over the Jordan Valley.
  • The “Palestinian state” would be completely de-militarized.
  • If Hamas remains in power in Gaza, the US would raise $1 billion from Gulf states for infrastructure projects that would be focused on creating a free trade zone in El-Arish, in the Sinai desert. Egypt would facilitate movement of workers from Gaza through the Rafah crossing. Israeli restrictions would continue as they have been.

If these points are accurate, the plan is a recipe for disaster. And the repercussions would be felt not only in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, but all around the region.

Palestine

The plan amounts to a thinly veiled threat to the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA). If the plans for El-Arish move forward, it further entrenches the separation between Gaza and the West Bank and makes reunification more complicated. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, already enduring fierce and justified criticism for being the biggest obstacle to reunification, can’t afford to be seen making it even harder.

That threat is implied more by Egypt’s support of this aspect of the plan than anything else. According to Haaretz’s Zvi Bar’el,

It seems that the Egyptian message has been heard, and according to a senior Fatah official in the West Bank, Yahya Rabah, the PA will begin paying the salaries to Gaza officials that it had suspended. Also, in coordination with Egypt, Fatah-Hamas reconciliation talks will resume with the goal of reviving the national-unity government in Gaza.

But whether or not there is movement toward reconciliation, the rest of the plan is a non-starter. No matter what kind of economic incentives the United States and its partners in the Persian Gulf offer, Palestinians are not going to accept a deal that leaves Israel in control of their freedom of movement from one population center to another and of the growth of their towns and cities. They will not accept a capital in Abu Dis just because they are being “allowed” to rename it al-Quds. They will not accept a pseudo-state with little sovereignty. And they will not simply forget all about the millions of Palestinian refugees living outside the West Bank and Gaza.

Abbas will reject the plan. As Kushner’s tone-deaf interview demonstrates, the Trump team won’t come up with a plan that could convince Abbas to come back to the table, let alone one that he could accept. In the short term, most Palestinians will welcome his rejection of it, but in the long run, it will only serve to underscore yet again that Abbas’ approach of talking rather than fighting has failed. Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will paint him as intransigent, and he will also likely face some backlash from the Saudis.

Hamas, since it too will certainly reject the deal out of hand, will need to find a way to keep working with Egypt. This plan allows for that possibility.

Israel

The Israeli government seems decidedly unenthusiastic about the Trump peace plan, and for good reason. The love affair between Netanyahu and Trump continues apace. The status quo may not be perfect, but it’s working well for most Israelis, and certainly for Netanyahu. The unrest in Gaza is little more than an unpleasant news story for most Israelis. The PA continues to maintain quiet in the West Bank, where in recent months even isolated attacks have been few and far between. The European Union is too concerned with Trump’s trade war and his violation of the Iran nuclear deal to worry about the occupation. Meanwhile, Israel’s relationships in the Gulf are moving along slowly, set back but not derailed by the US move of its embassy to Jerusalem.

Netanyahu’s domestic issues are overshadowed by these conditions. An indictment that seemed imminent at the beginning of the year continues to loom just beyond the horizon. The prime minister has managed to leverage Russia into pushing Iran out of Syria and has emerged from the first Israel-Iran engagements as the victor. Most Israelis are unaffected by the opprobrium their government has gotten for its response to peaceful protests in Gaza.

Neither the Israeli public nor Netanyahu wants to see the boat rocked right now. Israel’s leadership cannot help but realize that the Trump peace plan is a non-starter and, while they will humor Trump and are certainly prepared with their talking points to capitalize on the inevitable Palestinian rejection, they’d surely be just as happy if the plan remained a rumor.

Jordan

Perhaps the most baffling part of the rumored plan is the idea of giving Saudi Arabia an increased role on the Temple Mount. Exactly what that might mean is unclear, but any increased role for Saudi Arabia diminishes Jordan’s influence. Jordan’s role as guardian of Jerusalem’s holy sites is one of the pillars of the Hashemite dynasty’s increasingly shaky legitimacy. It was also the key selling point for the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel that has allowed the survival of an agreement highly unpopular among Jordanians.

Given the recent instability in Jordan and the role the kingdom plays in maintaining the status quo on the explosive issue of the Temple Mount, this point is a matter of grave concern. So much so, in fact, that Netanyahu made an impromptu trip to Jordan to meet with King Abdullah II. Just holding that meeting in Amman was a risky decision for Abdullah, as the recent protests in Gaza have intensified the always significant anti-Israel sentiment in Jordan. But the gravity of Abdullah’s concerns prompted him to meet with Netanyahu, presumably to shore up the Israeli prime minister’s support for his position.

Netanyahu surely must understand that there is no good, and potentially a great deal of harm, for Israel in shifting the status quo on the Temple Mount. He is very likely to intercede on this point on Abdullah’s behalf, especially since the deal will surely ignite a great deal of anger among Jordan’s own Palestinian population. Trump and his team, who tend to support the initiatives of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) might not have taken Abdullah’s side over their close ally, but they are much more likely to listen to Netanyahu. It would not be surprising to see this plank removed from their peace platform, but then it remains to be seen how MbS will respond.

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE

MbS is quickly developing a reputation as a policy bungler to go along with his much more positive reputation as a power broker.

It’s easy to understand the Saudi crown prince’s motivation to get a foothold in Jerusalem. It’s the one major Arab Muslim focal point that is outside of Saudi control. But bringing this controversy into an already fraught peace plan is simply foolhardy.

One effect of the Trump peace plan would be to relegate the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative—something Saudi King Salman sees as a major diplomatic accomplishment—to the dustbin of history. Indeed, Zvi Bar’el reports,

According to Arab sources, Saudi King Salman and his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, seem to disagree over this issue. While Mohammed is an enthusiastic supporter of the American plan and the separation of Gaza from the West Bank, his father is concerned about the criticism he could expect if he relinquished the principles of the 2002 Saudi peace initiative by splitting the ‘Palestinian problem’ into two parts and abandoning the position that East Jerusalem be the capital of Palestine.

The question is whether MbS would feel so slighted if the US canceled this part of the proposal that he would reduce his political or financial support for the rest.

These issues also touch on the ongoing dispute among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Trump wants Qatar involved in the financing of the Gaza projects. This is actually sensible, as far as it goes. Though ham-handed, it could be the Trump team’s attempt to start healing the GCC breach (which is at least to some degree Trump’s creation). It also makes sense to have Qatar, along with Egypt, continue to be a player in Gaza if Israel and the US want to reduce any potential for Iran to take a more substantial role there.

The Saudis and the United Arab Emirates, however, do not agree. Although their accusation that Qatar’s involvement would allow Iran to enter Gaza surreptitiously is disingenuous, they’re clearly not interested in repairing the year-long breach. They are so anxious to cut Qatar out of the equation that they have said they will pay more for the Gaza projects to make up for blocking the Qataris.

This is all simmering now, but it promises to be a much more difficult enigma for the US and the region if and when the peace plan is announced.

Egypt

Last Thursday, Egypt issued this statement: “Egypt supports all efforts and initiatives to reach a comprehensive agreement, based on international resolutions made in the past and on the principle of two states for two peoples in the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine.”

This would seem to fly in the face of the Trump plan. Egypt appears pleased with the idea of some investment in the free trade zone that might help to quell the violence in Sinai and ease conditions in Gaza. But Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi seems to recognize that this is not a substitute for a political solution. The statement clearly contradicts any plan for a Palestinian capital other than East Jerusalem and would also implicitly reject Israeli control of the Jordan Valley.

This schizophrenic attitude toward the Trump plan reflects the dueling impulses among an Arab leadership weary of Abbas and frustrated by the Palestinian issue. The MbS-led faction seems decidedly indifferent to the plight of the Palestinians, would like to work much more closely with Israel, and is not eager to differ with Trump. Somewhat more seasoned heads, such as al-Sisi and Abdullah, recognize the pitfalls of a plan that attempts to force a one-sided resolution down the Palestinians’ throats.

Like King Salman, al-Sisi does not favor entrenching the split between Gaza and the West Bank, which seems to be the strategy at the heart of this plan. Territorially, it reflects the desires of the Israeli right. But Netanyahu and his allies have pursued their vision of control of the Jordan Valley, keeping the settlements in place and isolating Gaza, in smaller steps. The less patient Americans are trying to move the process along faster, oblivious to the risks it entails.

The optimal outcome is for Trump to bury this plan. It stands to reason that a group of US Jews from the far right, who support Israeli settlements and hold Palestinian rights in low regard, is not likely to come up with a viable plan. Unless the rumored details are way off the mark, this plan cannot possibly succeed.

Mitchell Plitnick

Mitchell Plitnick is a political analyst and writer. His previous positions include vice president at the Foundation for Middle East Peace, director of the US Office of B’Tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, and co-director of Jewish Voice for Peace. His writing has appeared in Ha’aretz, the New Republic, the Jordan Times, Middle East Report, the San Francisco Chronicle, +972 Magazine, Outlook, and other outlets. He was a columnist for Tikkun Magazine, Zeek Magazine and Souciant. He has spoken all over the country on Middle East politics, and has regularly offered commentary in a wide range of radio and television outlets including PBS News Hour, the O’Reilly Factor, i24 (Israel), Pacifica Radio, CNBC Asia and many other outlets, as well as at his own blog, Rethinking Foreign Policy, at www.mitchellplitnick.com. You can find him on Twitter @MJPlitnick.

SHOW 18 COMMENTS

18 Comments

  1. Mark is doing what he always does when his “facts” are shown to be false: he blastes out a scattergun of non-sequiturs in the hope that they will make up in volume what they lack in relevance.

    Because, of course, his original claim was this: “Palestinian National Autonomy exists for more than 20 years, on the territory of the Gaza Strip and in areas A and B. All Jews were expelled from there long ago.”

    He is incorrect, and he isn’t made any *less* incorrect because of these irrelevancies…..

    Mark: “The Arabs killed hundreds of civilian Jews in Gaza.”… blah blah blah.

    This is a fact: there were no Jewish settlements – none whatsoever – in the areas that became the Gaza Strip during the Israel war of independence.

    There were only Palestinians.

    And at the end of 1949 there were a whole lot MORE Palestinians in that strip since the Haganah had expelled them from Arab villages such as Najd (i.e. the now-ethnically-cleansed city of Sderot).

    Mark actually has things backwards: w.r.t. the Gaza Strip it was ISRAEL who did all the expelling in 1948-49, and it was ISRAEL who then instigated an illegal colonization following the conquest of the strip in 1967.

    Mark: ….” about one million Jews were expelled from Arab countries and became citizens of Israel”… blah blah blah

    Indeed true, but that has nothing to do with either the Gaza Strip nor with Areas A and B of the West Bank.

    I commiserate with those 1 million Jews, and I urge them to seek their rightful compensation.

    But that compensation is due from Egypt, and from Libya, and from Algeria, and from all the other Arab countries that expelled their Jewish popln.

    It isn’t owed by the Palestinians of either Israel nor the Gaza Strip/West Bank, and the fate of those 1 million Jews does NOT justify the Israeli govt revoking the citizenship of the former nor colonizing the territory of the latter.

    Mark: “The Jews three times repulsed the attack of the Arab armies on Israel in 1948, 1967 and 1973 year.”

    Well, gosh, No, No, and…. No.

    The territory of the “Jewish state” was not attacked by external Arab Armies in 1948, the fighting was almost entirely restricted to the territory allocated to the “Arab State” i.e. those neighbouring Arab states were attempting to prevent the ISRAELI conquest of territory that was never allocated to it.

    And, of course, it is indisputably true that nobody “attacked” Israel in 1967. The IDF was the aggressor, from its sneak attack on Day One all the way to its violation of an agreed-upon ceasefire to seize the Golan Heights on Day Six.

    And, honestly, look at a map…… In 1973 the Egyptian army attacked an IDF that was garrisoned inside Egypt. And the Syrian army attacked an IDF what was garrisoned inside Syria. Neither army made the slightest attempt to carry the fight into Israel.

    Mark: “The UN decision on the partition of Palestine did not and could not be an indication that Jews must feed and maintain millions of Arabs between the Jordan River and the sea.”

    The Partition Plan clearly says that citizenship of the two successor-states would be determined entirely by place of residence at the time of independence, and not by their allegiance to one or other ethnic tribe.

    So ALL the Arabs who’s residency was in territory claimed by Israel (i.e. everything whose home was “inside” the pre-1967 lines) were – and still are – entitled to claim Israeli citizenship, and Israel has no legal standing to deny them that right.

    As for the popln of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (i.e. the territory seized by the IDF in June 1967) they are indisputably defined as “protected persons” under the international humanitarian laws that pertain to belligerent occupation.

    And, yes indeedie, Israel is under a legal obligation to feed and provide for those protected persons, and that remains true for as long at Israel insists on maintaining effective control over those territories.

    That’s what international law says, Mark, and Israel has no legitimate argument that would allow it to wriggle itself out from under those obligations.

    Honestly, you have no idea what you are talking about.

  2. While it may yet be preceded by two states, in the long run one state is inevitable. As the Zionist zealots die off, the new generation of Palestinians and Jews will realize that one state best serves their common interests. BTW, Palestinians already outnumber Jews between the River and the Sea and Jewish immigration is plummeting while emigration is soaring.

  3. Mark
    For your much needed edification:

    Reality:
    To quote Yehouda Shenhav, of Iraqi Jewish heritage and professor of sociology and anthropology at Tel Aviv University: “Any reasonable person, Zionist or non-Zionist, must acknowledge that the analogy drawn between Palestinians and Mizrahi [Arab] Jews is unfounded. Palestinian refugees did not want to leave Palestine….Those who left did not do so of their own volition. In contrast, Jews from Arab lands came to this country under the initiative of the State of Israel and Jewish organizations.” (Haaretz, 8 October 2004.)

    Also:
    Historian, Avi Shlaim, born into an affluent and influential family in Baghdad: “We are not refugees, nobody expelled us from Iraq, nobody told us that we were unwanted. But we are the victims of the Israeli-Arab conflict.” (Haaretz, August 11, 2005)

    Yisrael Yeshayahu, speaker of the Knesset: “We are not refugees…. We had messianic aspirations.”

    Shlomo Hillel, former minister and speaker of the Knesset: “I don’t regard the departure of Jews from Arab lands as that of refugees. They came here because they wanted to, as Zionists.”

    During a Knesset hearing into the matter, Ran Cohen, member of the Knesset: “I am not a refugee….I came at the behest of Zionism, due to the pull that this land exerts, and due to the idea of redemption. Nobody is going to define me as a refugee.” (Ha’aretz, October 8, 2004)

    It should not be forgotten that after having its bid for UN membership rejected twice, Israel signed the 1949 Lausanne Peace Conference Protocol and declared before the UN General Assembly that it would comply with UN Resolution 194, which, based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (binding on all UN members), calls for the repatriation of and/or compensation for the then near 800,000 Palestinian refugees, who as determined by Walter Eytan, then Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, were dispossessed and expelled by Jewish forces and the IDF before and during the 1948 war (including 400,000 between late 1947 and 15 May 1948), as a precondition for gaining UN admittance (see UNGA Resolution 273, 11 May 1949.) Israel is the only country admitted to the UN subject to a precondition. It has since refused to comply with its pledge and should have long since had its UN membership cancelled or suspended.

    The bottom line is that while well over one million Palestinians were brutally expelled from their homeland by Jewish militias and the IDF, they played no role whatsoever in the emigration of or any ill treatment and or loss of assets that Jews of Arab origin may have experienced in their former homelands. In short, apples and oranges.

  4. Actually, David, last year, 2017, Israeli Jews, presumably mainly Orthodox, outshtupped the Palestinians for Israel. So never count on anything here, although I guess it’s more likely longterm the Palestinians will keep outgrowing Jews.

  5. Pull the plug on the massive aid packages given to Israel from America and German and elsewhere and demand Israel get rid of their nukes or else. Problems solved.

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