by Robert E. Hunter
Iran shot down a Global Hawk U.S. surveillance drone and crowed about it. President Donald Trump says that he decided to strike back at Iran but called it off with 10 minutes to spare. Thus, the most dangerous international game of “chicken” in recent times came within moments of supreme folly by Iran and the United States, with disastrous consequences across the Middle East and in the global economy.
Leaders on both sides are acting out of pride, arrogance, stubbornness, and stupidity. They have intensified the risk that accident, miscalculation, or even decisions taken by low-level military commanders (in the Iranian case) can plunge everyone into an abyss, to the benefit of no one. The Iranians are led by a sclerotic religious fanatic; the United States has no such excuse. Serious people finally need to intervene. Given that President Trump has surrounded himself with uber-belligerent advisers—National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo—no one can have confidence he will do what he is first and foremost required to do as chief executive: to keep the United States safe. That includes keeping the nation out of needless wars that would put the lives of Americans, in and out of the military, in grave jeopardy.
The U.S.-Iranian move towards an insane showdown is only one of two events this week that reveal the incoherent state of U.S. policies toward the Persian Gulf region.
Showdown with Iran
In the Iran case, the first question to ask is why the United States would be flying a surveillance drone in a potentially disputed area. It is not as though there aren’t other ways of acquiring information. And it is not as though the Iranians might be moving troops or other military capacity in ways that signal preparations for open conflict. Most likely, in fact, the decision to fly the drone was not taken in Washington but by some commander in the field.
This is coupled with the U.S. decision to move 1,000 more troops into the region, presumably to increase pressure on Iran. Given that they would be irrelevant to an US-Iranian conflict, which would involve air strikes rather than ground operations, this is not a signal, only noise.
The Iranians are also taking major risks. Why shoot down the U.S. drone, no matter where it was? The Iranian ambassador to the United Nations wrote to the UN Secretary General that “While the Islamic Republic of Iran does not seek war, it … is determined to vigorously defend its land, sea and air.” But it is relying on U.S. forbearance and forgetting that in 1988 the USS Vincennes erroneously shot down an Iranian civilian airliner with 274 people aboard, an overreaction at a time of tensions.
Miscalculation is part of warfare: the “fog of war.” Current tensions have already passed this first stage of conflict. Last week, two crude oil tankers were attacked, not in the Strait of Hormuz (the choke point) but out in the Gulf of Oman. Who did it? Very likely it was the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC.) Even if it were some other actor, the blame could credibly be laid at the Iranian doorstep along with the possible result, escalation by miscalculation.
Perhaps neither Iran nor the United States wants an open war. Perhaps the attacks on the oil tankers, one of which has a Japanese owner, were intended as a signal during the visit to Iran of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Coming so soon after Abe’s meeting with President Trump in Washington and despite Trump’s denials, some form of negotiations between Washington and Teheran seemed to be on the horizon. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, with a profit structure that depends on Iran’s isolation from the global economy, may very well have wanted to scotch that possibility, however remote. Others with an interest in forestalling any sort of US-Iranian rapprochement include Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel.
On the U.S. side, President Trump reportedly told his people to cool the rhetoric, which was a good move, though it was vitiated by his declaration that war was only 10 minutes away. Despite Trump’s most recent decisions, there continues to be a widespread hope that, although the president wants to exert “maximum pressure” on Iran, he doesn’t want to see another war in the Middle East, with all its imponderables, not least in domestic politics.
An Incidents at Sea Agreement
Some useful steps might be possible to help keep this game of “chicken” from getting out of hand. Militaries tend to be best at that task, as U.S. and Russian militaries have demonstrated by communicating directly with one another in Syria to “deconflict” their respective air operations. At a more profound level, in May 1972, in the midst of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded an Incidents at Sea Agreement. This happened because both sides realized that ships can bump into one another, and this includes military vessels. Ship drivers are only human, and navigation systems, however sophisticated, should not be relied upon to keep countries from going to war.
It is obviously in the U.S. interest to prevent an incident in the Strait of Hormuz, the Persian Gulf, or the Sea of Oman that could impel the United States to escalate to open war with Iran. Maybe the IRGC, which seems in practical control of Iranian military activities, may not see it that way. Maybe its leaders are all idiots, or the clerical leadership either cares little for Iran’s future or has convinced itself that, for some unknown reason, the United States will blink first. But there are ways of finding out whether Iran would be open at least to an Incidents at Sea agreement (assuming that Washington is also open to it), and militaries from any one of several unengaged countries could quietly explore the possibility with Iranian counterparts.
Many other steps are need to keep the U.S.-Iranian confrontation from getting out of hand and to promote an outcome that makes sense for both sides of the continuing crisis. Such a de-escalation process would be immensely complicated and might not even be possible given the current leaderships in the United States and Iran. But for now, the problem is how to keep things from getting out of hand, to everyone’s detriment.
The Khashoggi Factor
The mess in the region was further complicated this week by the report of UN-mandated special rapporteur Agnes Callamard regarding the slaughter last October of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. The UN-sponsored report, which has a high degree of credibility, makes for grisly reading and removes any doubt that the death and dismemberment of Khashoggi was the Saudi intent all along. The report also makes a highly credible case that ultimate responsibility and almost certainly foreknowledge rest with the effective leader of Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS).
The Saudis must now recognize that MbS is no longer welcome in the United States and almost surely never again will be. If he sets foot here, his visit would rightly be dominated in the media and Congress by Khashoggi, Khashoggi, Khashoggi. Thus, he is a useless interlocutor for what is Saudi Arabia’s most critical foreign relationship, but a relationship no longer as important for the United States now that it has lessened its dependence on Saudi hydrocarbons.
The Trump administration must surely be aware that MbS has become a liability and that turmoil in the U.S.-Saudi relationship also complicates strategic calculations regarding Iran. Put simply, Trump didn’t need this second crisis on top of the first one, and they reinforce one another as problems for the United States.
The Khashoggi affair is, of course, not just a matter of one journalist butchered and one Saudi leader who thought he could deal with impunity with his opponents. It has also shone a spotlight on the war in Yemen, which is among other things a human rights disaster. Iran plays an important role in the conflict, but nothing compared to what the Saudis have been doing, as an extension of ambitions going back several decades. Along with Britain, the United States continues to provide most of the military wherewithal that enables the Saudis to continue their brutal campaign, which includes deliberate attacks on civilians. (The United Kingdom is only slightly behind the United States as arms supplier, and a British court has now ruled that UK arms exports to Saudi Arabia need to be carefully reviewed to determine whether they are consistent with British human rights standards.)
Following Khashoggi’s murder, both houses of Congress, including many Republicans as well as Democrats, voted to cut off military supplies to Saudi Arabia. Trump vetoed the legislation, and his veto was sustained. But that did not end the matter. The UN report has once again called attention to the U.S. role in Yemen, leading even one of the Senate’s premier Republican hawks, Lindsey Graham, to say that “While I understand that Saudi Arabia is a strategic ally, the behavior of Mohammed bin Salman cannot be ignored.” The Senate then promptly voted to cut off arms sales to Saudi Arabia, and the House of Representatives will likely follow suit, but probably not by a veto-proof majority.
It is not hard to see why the Trump administration continues to buy into the Saudi military campaign in Yemen. It stems directly from the administration’s obsession with Iran, which is shared by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and some others in the region, notably Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Israel. But now, with MBS almost surely on a permanent U.S. blacklist, his father, King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, faces an existential dilemma. Removing MbS from power and thus caving into the opinion of outsiders, including the United States, would be an affront to Saudi feelings. But keeping MbS in charge increases the risks of major damage to Saudi relations with its leading patron. Maybe there will be a work around to save face on both sides, but none is currently apparent.
Rethinking Basics
The Trump administration needs to rethink U.S. interests in the region, to disenthrall itself from the interests and attitudes of its partners in the region that do not also mesh with U.S. interests, and to start figuring out a new way forward. Certainly, the current course is paying no dividends while keeping the United States tied to others’ interests, consuming resources, potentially putting American lives at risk to no good purpose, and diverting attention from other problems, notably connected to Russia and China.
Many ideas and alternatives are available. This is not rocket science.
But it’s not clear whether Trump will see the necessity of a major course correction. He might well continue to let his senior advisers, notably Bolton and Pompeo, conspire with the worst of the Iranian hardliners to block a reduction of U.S.-Iranian tensions. That course, bordering on insanity in Teheran as well as in Washington, is a recipe for disaster for all concerned.
Amb. Hunter writes of 2 interlinked challenges – Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Iran opened to negotiations with the international community as a result of the maximum sanctions authorized by the Security Council via UNSCR1927 in 2010. These sanctions were willingly enforced by the five permanent members of the Security Council plus the EU and its member states as well as most other countries. The EU played a very prominent role in enforcing the sanctions. Among other actions EU legislation required that the SWIFT system deny transactions with Iranian banks as long as the sanctions were in effect. China, Russia and the EU enforced the sanctions because they engaged in addressing the threat of Iran as a nuclear weapons state in the context of global policy with the 2009 Security Council Summit on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament, which an important factor in solidifying the commitment to joint action by the P5+1 (EU). Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions had been a Security Council issue for more than a decade, but the agreement on joint action on enforcing sanctions against Iran pressured Iran to engage in negotiations that permitted enhanced inspections by the IAEA and enforcement thru sanctions.
The president of Iran to 2013 Ahmedinejad, was a firebrand who had threatened the destruction of Israel from the podium of the UN General Assembly. Hassan Rouhani was elected president of Iran in 2013 in a contested election opposed by hardliners to advance negotiations with the P5+1 to end Iran’s nuclear weapons programs and through that lessen sanctions imposed by the Security Council on Iran that had been enforced from 2010. The result of these negotiations was the JCPOA authorized by the Security Council on July 20, 2015 via UNSCR2231. Implementation began only on January 16, 2016, after the IAEA had certified that Iran was fully compliant with JCPOA. Little sanctions relief was provided to Iran in the brief period that sanctions were relaxed to Trump’s imposition of unilateral sanctions..
The CIA has confirmed that Iran has not violated JCPOA, but Trump had made JCPOA and Iran a campaign issue and had to deliver on promises made. Trump claimed that Iran had violated JCPOA and that JCPOA was defective because it did not address non-nuclear concerns with Iran principally Iran’s support for Hezbollah and other groups that threaten Israel and other U.S. allies as well as its missile development. While in January 2018 the Trump administration reached a compromise with the E3 (UK, France and Germany) that would have kept the U.S. in JCPOA under advise of Bolton and others Trump nixed the compromise. Congress declined to give Trump a solution to exit JCPOA despite the anti-JCPOA rhetoric of Rubio and others.
In July 2017 John Bolton addressed the MEK congress and called for regime change in Iran. In August 2017 he published a plan for regime change in Iran that did not require the consent of Congress and could impose maximum sanctions on Iran without Security Council authorization that could bring Iran’s oil exports to zero. Bolton’s plan gave Trump the solution to exit JCPOA. Trump fired those that opposed exiting JCPOA and hired Bolton in April 2018 to implement the plan for regime change. The plan was pursued in a manner to preclude Iran from seeking negotiations with the U.S. The intent was to remove the regime and not to negotiate with it.
An assumption of Bolton’s plan is that Iran’s economy is in crisis drained by support for the fight against ISIS and other Sunni Jihadists in Syria and other conflicts in the M.E., pummeled by maximum sanctions, and facing an extremely severe drought. Such a drought in a U.S. state would make it eligible for federal emergency assistance.
Bolton is overly eager to demonstrate U.S. power. In Venezuela Bolton’s intrusion strengthened the hand of Maduro and weakened prospects for resolution of the crisis.
Bolton’s plan for regime change is strengthening the resolve of the people of Iran to resist. The tempo of anti-government protests in Iran is not increasing. Hardliners that opposed JCPOA and negotiations with the U.S. are reasserting their power and seek to defiantly resume nuclear weapons work.
Iran has four times the population of Iraq and far more difficult terrain for warfighting than Iraq. It also has more effective military capacity and probably could cut oil traffic in the Hormuz strait. The EU, which neighbors Iran, has been vitally concerned about Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions. Therefor, it fully supports JCPOA. However, if the U.S. intends to attack Iran EU member states will be very reluctant in their support of such an attack. The civil war in Syria drove millions of refugees out of Syria. A civil war in Iran could be much worse.
The primary purpose why Iran was in Syria was to keep that country from being overrun by Sunni jihadist groups supported by Saudi Arabia. Iran sponsored fighters in Syria fought on the side of the U.S. to defeat ISIS. With the defeat of ISIS the U.S. is withdrawing from Syria and Iran has no compelling reason for presence in Syria. There will be no Iranian troops massed on Syria’s border with Israel.
Iran is not the only country in the Middle East concerned about the rights of Palestinians. The Palestinian issue is supported by Saudi Arabia no less than by Iran. King Salman continues to declare his support for Palestinians and Hamas, and Saudi Arabia continues to not recognize Israel.The present leadership of Israel, prime minister Netanyahu openly called for war against Iran at the Middle East Peace Symposium in Warsaw in February (otherwise known as the anti-Iran summit). Iran’s security is under threat from its neighbors. Iran’s security interests need to be addressed no less than Saudi or Israeli interests.
Missiles are a complex problem in their own right. Iran has to date limited the range of missiles with no declared interest in developing intercontinental missiles. Normal diplomacy can address this issue and does not require regime change in Iran.
The JCPOA offers a clear approach to keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons thru 2030. However, the sanctions regime associated with JCPOA that was authorized by the Security in 2010 and is a part of JCPOA have no time limit. If Iran resumes nuclear weapons development those sanctions can be snapped back by the P5+1 beyond the term specified in JCPOA.
Yes, the U.S. needs to exit from Bolton’s plan for regime change, reenter JCPOA, and work with the P5+1 and other parties through the Security Council, as it die with JCPOA, to comprehensively address the security interests of the countries in the M.E.
Ambassador Hunter’s piece has brought forth good comments. VIDBELDAVS particularly hits good points in my view. Several have correctly pointed to the importance of the US-Israel relationship, in this complex intersection of history and current interests. My view on that fundamental piece of the puzzle will not sit well with some Persian and Arab commentators.
President Trump continues to tweet in capitals: IRAN NEVER WILL GET NUCLEAR WEAPONS. That is the fundamental principle – of Israel — there shall be only one nuclear-armed State in our region. I think a large majority of Americans agree with that principle, and are willing to support Israel to see that it remains true.
Israel used a military attack to block the first Iraqi nuclear weapon facility (provided by France), and a military attack to block the Syrian nuclear weapon facility (provided by DPRK). Iran, learning from those attacks, placed its two enrichment facilities deep underground. The heavy water reactor at Arak would have been perfect for producing plutonium, just like the initial production reactor in Pakistan, but with home-produced heavy water, instead of heavy water from Canada.
The JCPOA does impede Iran’s routes to a nuke for a decade and more. And it is true that the world would quickly learn of an Iranian dash for the bomb, through IAEA and national technical means. But, with JCPOA, the knowledge remains there, and the enrichment capability is improving. In Israel’s view, Iran continues to pose a serious threat to its ‘1-nuclear state’ principle, not today, but possibly tomorrow. How to eliminate that threat is the question for Israel – and the US.
The satisfactory answer is to have a change in a government in Iran so that is an ally of the US and renounces, really, nuclear weapon ambitions (and other things, like not threatening Israel – see Pompeo’s 12 demands). That’s what ‘regime change’ in Iran is about for Israel and the US.
Think about how you would plan to achieve that regime change. You certainly don’t want to start by killing 150 Iranians, leading to the countrywide mourning described by a commentator. What you would want is a decapitation strike, and as little destruction as possible in the country, so the most people are not directly affected and can embrace the new government given to them. One reads how, in the old days, assassination by beheading during prayer or poison were used to remove a leader. Regrettably, today it probably takes precision guided missiles. The opportunity for such a strike, in the US political situation, is now. So, that’s what looks to me to be the probable coming event.
Waiting for the reports and hopefully photos of the mad scramble there must have been (and still may be) in the Strait of Hormuz waters to pick up the wreckage of the downed surveillance drone. On which side of the Iranian territory line did it take place?
VIDBELDAVS — Thanks for your sober analysis. The only parts of it I disagree with are:
a) Iran’s regime did not have a “nuclear weapons” program (at least since 2003) and this issue was “consensually manufactured” (Per Chomsky) due to the need of the “military industrial complex” for a menacing Islamic “enemy” — in the absence of “communism.”
And,
b) Iran’s regime agreed to the “nuclear deal” not ONLY “as a result of the maximum sanctions authorized by the Security Council via UNSCR 1927 in 2010,” but ALSO (and significantly) because of democratic nonviolent popular pressure by “reformists,” including myself (in exile in the U.S.) who have been pressing (at least from Mossadegh’s era in the 1950s) for DEMOCRACY, i.e., simultaneous resistance to “internal despotism” and “external colonialism” — which Dr. Mossadegh said, correctly, are “two sides of the same coin,” either co-dependent as “friends” (Trump and MBS) or as “enemies” (Khamenei and Netanyahu).
To ignore the MORAL role of nonviolent democratic reformism (not only in Iran) is to strengthen (i.e., give primacy to) the IMMORAL role of “colonial” savagery–especially when such ignoring is done in the name of “realism.”
Again, Thank you for your mostly accurate analysis, and especially for your recommendation:
“[The] U.S. needs to exit from Bolton’s plan for regime change, reenter [the] JCPOA, and work with the P5+1 and other parties through the Security Council, as it did with [the] JCPOA, to comprehensively address the security interests of [ALL] countries in the Middle East.”
Peace and justice,
Moji Agha (please google my name for my mini-bio)
Colorado, U.S.
Ambassador Hunter, IMHO, you and your dear spouse Shireen are part of the problem and NOT part of the solutions in the US foreign policy regarding the ME. Both of you are trying to stay in the middle of road talking about Tehran/DC relationship. There’s no middle of road for these 2 countries. If you can not take side with either country, I don’t care which side, then you are becoming part of the problem. I truly understand that you are on the US pension plan and you have no intentions of jeopardizing your livelihood. So my recommendation to you is that you and Shireen ought to take the US side 120% of the time. That way the readers know exactly where you stand and not getting confused with your writings. Much appreciated for keeping this suggestion in mind while you’re writing your articles in the future.